A new forward-secure threshold digital signature scheme which based on multiplicative secret sharing and strong RSA assumption is put forward in this paper. The scheme has the following property: It have the property of forward security, even if more than the threshold numbers of players are compromised, it is not possible to forge the signature which is related to the past. This property is achieved while keeping the public key fixed and updating the secret keys at regular intervals. Assuming that factoring is hard, we proved that this scheme is security in the random oracle model.
Introduction
With the rapid development of information technology, information security has become one of the biggest challenges in the society, as one of the core of information security technology, the digital signature technology has become an important topic in the research of scholars. But with the deepening of network requirements, ordinary digital signature technology has been unable to ensure the security of information more effectively, as a kind of digital signature with special properties of multiple parties, it has drawn more attention of scholars. The method of using secret sharing [1] [2] [3] [4] distributed the keys in multiple servers, the embodiment of this idea is a threshold signature scheme. Because the signature is computed in a distributed environment based on secret sharing, the opponent must buy enough members of the server in order to get the key and signature.
Distribution of the secret key makes it harder for an adversary to obtain it, but does not remove this risk. Common mode failures flaws that may be present in the implementation of the protocol or the operating system being run on all servers| imply that breaking into several machines may not be much harder than breaking into one. Thus, it is realistic to assume that even a distributed secret key can be exposed. Literature [5] suggest a second line of defense which provide forward security to threshold signature schemes, so that one can mitigate the damage caused by complete key exposure.
In 1997, Anderson [6] first proposed the forward security theory. 1999 Bellare [7, 8] proposed a forward secure digital signature scheme. In 2001, Itkis and Reyzin [9] proposed a forward secure signature scheme, it can realize effective signature verification and storage, but the efficiency is relatively low. In 2002 Kozlov [10] and others proposed a forward secure signature scheme by using a fast updating algorithm. The scheme is characterized by short cycle and being suitable for mobile computing. At present many scholars also did a lot of research on the forward security theory. Such as Cai-Fen Wang [11] proposed a forward security secret sharing scheme, based on hard problems of the discrete logarithm in finite field and the strong RSA assumption, it effectively realized the forward security of the secret, and the scheme has a strong practical value.
This article adopts the method of multiplication secret sharing, using the strong RSA assumption [12] , integrating the forward security and threshold signature ideas into the signature generating process, so that opponents who even obtain the signature information of the current time cannot get any information about previous signature. 
Communication Model
The participants in our scheme include a set of n players who are connected by a broadcast channel. Additionally, they are capable of private point-to-point communication over secure channels. (Such channels might be implemented on the broadcast channel using cryptographic techniques.) Furthermore, we assume that there exists a trusted center during the setup phase and that the players are capable of both broadcast and point-to-point communication with him.
Forward-Secure Threshold Signature Schemes
threshold signature scheme is one in which the secret signing key is distributed among a set of n players, and the generation of any signature requires the cooperation of some size-k subset of honest players. In addition, any adversary who learns t or fewer shares of the secret key is unable to forge signatures. A threshold scheme has the advantages of a distributed secret while often not requiring all n players to participate each time a signature is generated.
In this paper, we are concerned with
forward-secure threshold signature schemes. These schemes make use of the key evolution paradigm, and their operation is divided into some time periods. Throughout the lifetime of the scheme, the public key is fixed, but the secret key changes at each time period. As in standard signature schemes, there is a key generation protocol, a signing protocol, and a verification algorithm. In a forward-secure scheme, however, there is an additional component known as the evolution or update protocol, which specifies how the secret key is to evolve throughout the lifetime of the scheme. A
key-evolving threshold signature scheme can tolerate at most t corrupted players and works as follows.
Key generation phase. Given a security parameter k , the public and the secret keys are generated and distributed to the players. This can be accomplished with a trusted center.
Key update phase. At the start of each time period, an update protocol is executed among any subset of u k non-corrupted players. The protocol modifies the secret key for the signature scheme. After the update protocol is executed, each non-corrupted player will have a share of the new secret for that time period. Forward-secure schemes require that the secret key from the previous time period be deleted from the user's machine as part of the update protocol.
Signatures generation phase: To generate signatures, a subset of s k players executes the signing protocol, which generates a signature for a message m using the secret key of the current time period. The signature is a pair consisting of the current time period and a tag. Assuming that all players behave honestly, the signature will be accepted as valid by the verification algorithm.
Signatures verification phase: Verification works the same as in a normal digital signature scheme. The verifying algorithm can be executed by any individual who possesses the public key. It returns either "Accept" or "Reject" to specify whether a particular signature is valid for a given message. We say that signature is a valid signature of message m during time period j if performing the verification algorithm on the message-signature pair returns "Accept".
The Proposed Scheme
Here, we use   1, , , MFST n n n n  expression a forward-secure threshold digital signature scheme which is based on multiplicative secret sharing. When sharing a value X multiplicatively, each player  holds a random share
for a given modulus N. The key generation protocol is executed by a trusted center, which generates and sends a share of the initial secret key to each player. Key evolution is executed by each player individually assisted by a trusted center, and it does not require any player interaction. The generation of signature requires the participation of (and interaction between) all n players. Finally, verification of a signature may be performed by any party in possession of the public key, and no interaction of parties is required.
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